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Natural events impacting on process plants may lead to severe technological accidents. These events are 
usually defined as NaTech events (Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters). In order to derive 
the frequencies of accident scenarios associated to NaTech events for QRA (Quantitative Risk 
Assessment) implementation, a critical issue is the availability of equipment vulnerability models. The aim 
of the present study was to present a vulnerability model for the assessment of failure probability of 
atmospheric vessels involved in flooding events. The vulnerability model was based both on the severity of 
the natural event and on the construction features of the equipment. In order to explore the model features 
and its potentialities, the application to case-studies was carried out analysing an actual industrial layout. 
The results obtained confirmed that NaTech scenarios caused by floods may have an important influence 
on risk assessment and management of industrial facilities. 
1. Introduction 
Natural events may impact on process installations triggering severe technological accidents (NaTech 
events) by damaging process and storage equipment (Young at al., 2004), and leading to the loss of 
containment (LOC) of hazardous materials (Cozzani et al., 2010). Specific studies (Salzano et al., 2009) 
demonstrated that NaTech events often occurred in the past with severe consequences in industrial 
facilities and treatment plants (Panico et al., 2013). This was confirmed by the analysis of past accidents 
(Renni et al., 2010). 
The implementation of NaTech scenarios in the framework of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a 
critical task (Campedel et al., 2008), especially for facilities located in areas affected by natural hazards 
(flooding, earthquakes, tsunami, etc.) (Cruz et al., 2006). Previous studies focused on the NaTech 
implementation in QRA (Antonioni et al., 2009), highlighting that the more crucial step is the definition of 
reliable tools for the estimation of the NaTech scenarios frequency (Cozzani et al., 2013). The present 
study focused on a methodology for evaluation of the accident frequency induced by flooding on industrial 
equipment by the use of a specific vulnerability model, which was developed for an equipment category 
often involved in accidents triggered by flooding (Cozzani et al., 2010): atmospheric vertical cylindrical 
vessels for the storage of liquids. 
The impact mode of flooding was first schematized on the basis of the analysis of past accidents in 
industrial facilities involved in floods. A mechanical model was then developed, based on the comparison 
between the flooding intensity and the resistance of a vessel. The mechanical model, validated against the 
available data obtained from past accident records, was applied to generate an extended data set of 
failure conditions, aimed at the calculation of simplified correlations able to yield a conservative estimation 
of equipment failure conditions and, thus, of failure probability. 
The proposed vulnerability model was finally applied for the analysis of an industrial lay-out, in order to test 
the validity of the model and highlight the contribution of NaTech-induced accidents to the risk profile of a 
facility. 
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2. Methodology 
The aim of the present study was to present a methodology for the evaluation of failure probability of 
atmospheric vertical vessels involved in flooding events and thus to estimate the associated frequency for 
QRA implementation. The methodology, divided in six steps, was based on the definition of equipment-
specific vulnerability functions taking into account both the severity of the natural event and the 
construction features of the equipment. The following sections illustrate the steps of the methodology. 
2.1 STEP 1: Schematization of the reference equipment 
From the analysis of past accidents triggered by floods (Cozzani et al., 2010), it was evidenced that above 
ground atmospheric storage tanks are the process items that were more frequently damaged in flood 
events. This vessel type consists in a vertical cylinder with fixed or floating roof operating at atmospheric 
pressure (see the scheme in Figure 1). Tanks bottom is typically flat and directly fixed to the ground with a 
dap joint. This type of vessel is mainly used for liquid storage at near-atmospheric pressure. 
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Figure 1: schematization of atmospheric storage tanks involved in flooding events. 
Table 1 reports the features of the vessels considered in the present study. A specific vessel database 
was built (Landucci et al., 2012). Vessel geometries and design data were obtained from API standard 
650, while the volumes and diameters were based on data gathered from several oil refineries. 
Table 1:  reference vessel geometries considered in the present study. See Figure 1 for vessel sketch and 
parameters identification.  
Vessel class D (m) H (m) t (mm) Capacity (m3) Pcr (Pa, see Eq.5) 
Small capacity 3-42 3.6–18 5–12.5 < 5,000 6,932–19,285 
Medium capacity 21-54 3.6–16.2 12.5 5,000 – 10,000 5,180–11,171 
Large capacity 48-66 3.6-7.2 12.5-15 >10,000 4,361-12,666 
2.2 STEP 2: Characterization of flooding conditions 
The elements needed for the characterization of the flooding impact are essentially the flooding frequency 
and severity. The flood frequency has been estimated using the return period (tr, given by hydrological 
studies or available at local competent authorities) as follows: 
rtf /1=  (1) 
Several possible modalities of flood impact must be distinguished (slow submersion and high depth wave; 
moderate speed wave; high speed wave with limited depth, etc). Hence, the flood severity was quantified 
by two parameters: water depth (hw) and water speed (vw). 
On the basis of available data on past events reasonable ranges of both hw and vw were collected and 
reported in Table 2. Table 2 also summarizes the flooding conditions used for the analysis of the case 
studies (see Section 3). 
Table 2:  flooding conditions selected for the present study.  
Flooding conditions Height hw (m) Velocity vw (m/s) Return period tr (y) Frequency f (y-1)
Range for the present study 0 – 4 0 – 3.5 50 – 500 2.0×10-3 - 2.0 ×10-2
W1 (case study 1) 0.7 0.7 50 2.0 × 10-2 
W2 (case study 2) 1.8 0.25 500 2.0 × 10-3 
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2.3 STEP 3: Mechanical model set up 
Figure 1 schematizes the forces acting on the atmospheric vessels when impacted by a flood wave. The 
external load present on the tank shell, namely Pw, is obtained as the sum of a “static” pressure 
component Pws and of a “dynamic” pressure component Pwd as follows: 
2
ww2
1
wwwdwsw wvkhgPPP ρρ +=+=  (2) 
where g is the gravity constant (9.81 m/s2), ρw is the density of the floodwater and kw is the hydrodynamic 
coefficient (Gudmestad and Moe, 1996). The static pressure component Pws is due to the hydrostatic load 
of the floodwater, while the dynamic component Pwd is due to the drag force associated to the kinetic 
energy of the wave. A constant temperature of 293 K and an atmospheric pressure of 1.01 bar were 
assumed in the present study, thus the fluid properties are considered constant in the above relations. 
The internal pressure of the tank (Pf), related to the hydrostatic pressure of the internal liquid hold up, has 
an important role in the evaluation of the resistance of the tank to flood external pressure. The maximum Pf 
value, at the bottom of the vessel, may be expressed as follows: 
φρ HgP ff =  (3) 
where ρf is the density of the inner fluid, H is the height of the tank and ϕ is the filling level. Therefore, the 
net pressure Pnet on the vessel shell may be derived from a simple force balance: 
fwdwsnet PPPP −+=  (4) 
The external Pnet acting on the vessel may cause the structural integrity loss by instability (Timoshenko 
and Gere, 1961) and typically affects atmospheric vessels. Instability may occur if the Pnet reaches a 
critical value, Pcr (critical pressure). Pcr depends only on the vessel geometry and on the construction 
material (independent from the loading conditions), and may be calculated by the following expression: 
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(5) 
in which E and ν are respectively the elastic modulus and Poisson’s ratio of the construction material; t, D, 
H the vessel thickness, diameter and height, and n is an integer number defined as follows: 
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(6) 
Therefore, given a set of vessels of interest, the Pcr is evaluated and compared with the Pnet, which results 
from different flooding and storage conditions. The failure for instability of atmospheric vessels is hence 
predicted by the model if Pcr becomes greater or equal respect to Pnet. 
Table 3:  parameters assumed for the present study (Landucci et al., 2012). Ranges are given for the 
typical flooding conditions (Rijkswaterstaat, 2005) and for the materials commonly used for atmospheric 
vessels construction, based on API Standard 650 (API, 2003). 
Parameter Present study Minimum value Maximum value 
kw 1.8  1.6 2.2 
ρw (kg/m3) 1,100 1,000 1,200 
E* (GPa) 205 190 210 
ν* 0.29 0.26 0.3 
ρf0 (kg/m3) 1,000** - - 
(* Function of the vessel material; ** Reference density for vessel design) 
 
The failure model may be used to evaluate the resistance of vessels undergoing different flooding 
conditions (represented by different values of vw and hw) considering different storage/processing 
conditions (e.g., internal fluid density and filling level). Model results are discussed in the following, while 
Table 3 collects the values assumed for model parameters and the possible range of values used for 
model validation and sensitivity analysis (Section 2.4).  
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2.4 STEP 4: Model validation and sensitivity analysis 
Data on flood damage to equipment items are scarce and not detailed, often providing only qualitative 
information (Krausmann et al. 2011). Hence, in order to validate the model, a damage threshold was 
derived from a previous study based on an extended past accident data analysis (Rijkswaterstaat, 2005). 
The damage threshold was the value of external pressure Pw below which vessel damage and/or loss of 
containment was never reported in past accidents. This resulted equal to 9.4 kPa, associated to a flood 
wave with a velocity of 2 m/s and a maximum height of 0.5 m (Rijkswaterstaat, 2005). Failure model 
predictions may be validated comparing the resistance of the vessels considered a tank database (see 
Table 1) with respect to the damage threshold considered. Due to the uncertainties in the input 
parameters, both referred to construction steel and flooding properties the validation was carried out for 
the values assumed in the present study, for the maximum and minimum range parameters see (Table 3). 
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Figure 2: a) failure fraction of the tanks subjected to the reference flood impact conditions as a function of 
the filling level for different sets of input parameters; b) envelope correlation for the straightforward 
estimation of the vessel critical pressure 
Figure 2a shows the failure fraction (%) of atmospheric vessels subjected to the reference flooding 
conditions. Considering the input parameters adopted for the present study (e.g., data represented by the 
solid line) few vessels failed even when empty (about 35 % predicted failure fraction). Moreover, changing 
the input parameters, according to the credible range reported in Table 3, the predicted failure fraction 
reaches zero for filling level values higher than 15 %. Thus, the validation evidenced that failure conditions 
predicted by the model are robust respect to the choice of credible input parameters and in sufficient 
agreement with the available literature data. 
2.5 STEP 5: Model application and definition of a simplified envelope correlation 
In order to obtain simplified correlations for a straightforward estimation of the vessel failure and to derive 
a vulnerability model, the filling level of the vessel was considered as the critical parameter. Since the 
geometry of the storage vessel and the characteristics of the stored substance are defined, the only 
operating parameter which affects vessel resistance to flooding is the filling level. Thus, a Critical Filling 
Level (CFL) of a vessel may thus be defined as the minimum ϕ value able to ensure the tank resistance to 
a flood wave of a given intensity: 
gH
PPPCFL
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crwdws
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(7) 
The CFL may be obtained by Eq. 7 if the value of Pcr is calculated applying Eq. 5. However, in order to 
obtain a straightforward Pcr estimation, the following correlation was obtained as a function of the vessel 
capacity C by the analysis of the extended dataset of failure conditions (see Figure 2b): 
21 kCkPcr +=  (8) 
where k1=-0.199, k2=6950, C is expressed in m3 and Pcr in Pa. The correlation underestimates the 
minimum Pcr for each vessel capacity leading to shortcut evaluation on the safe side. The maximum error 
of the correlation (around 40%) is related to smaller vessels, which are likely to trigger less relevant and 
less hazardous release scenarios due to the limited fluid inventory. 
2.6  STEP 6: Assessment of vessel vulnerability and damage frequency 
Figure 1 shows the approach to the assessment of atmospheric tanks vulnerability to flooding (namely Ψ). 
If the filling level is lower than the CFL (marked by a dashed bold line in Figure 1), the tank is in the 
“unsafe conditions” zone since the vessel is not able to resist to the external pressure. In the present 
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approach, for the sake of simplicity, a linear distribution of possible operative filling levels between φmin 
(=1 %) and φmax (=75 %) is assumed in the definition of Ψ. On the basis of these considerations, the 
vessels damage probability Ψ is derived by the ratio between the “unsafe conditions” with respect to all the 
possible operative conditions, finally obtaining the damage frequency as follows: 
minmax
min
φφ
φ
−
−
×=Ψ×= CFLfffLOC
 
(9) 
where f (1/y) is the frequency of flooding of a given intensity (vw; hw).  
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Definition of the case studies 
In order to test the methodology in a typical QRA framework, a vulnerability analysis of a tank farm (Figure 
3) was carried out to assess the expected damage probability and the associated hazardous materials 
release frequencies (fLOC) caused by flood conditions. Figure 3 summarizes the features of the vessels 
analysed and reports the densities of the stored substances. Two reference flooding scenarios were 
considered, as summarized in Table 2: 
  - Case study 1: low severity flooding (W1 conditions) with low return period and thus high frequency; 
  - Case study 2: high severity flooding (W2 conditions) with high return period and thus low frequency. 
 
ID tank Capacity (m3)
Liquid density 
(kg/m3)
Diameter
(m)
Height
(m)
Thickness
(mm)
T1-T2 5494 850 36 5.4 12.5
T3-T4 7325 700 36 7.2 12.5
T5 9156 850 36 9 12.5
T6-T7 5494 1100 36 5.4 12.5
T8 18086 1100 40 14.4 23
T9-T10 7478 800 42 5.4 12.5
T11 7325 1100 36 7.2 12.5
T12 7478 850 42 5.4 12.5
T13 6359 850 30 9 12.5
T14-T15 7630 900 30 10.8 12.5
T16 3662 950 36 3.6 10.1
T17 18086 650 40 14.4 23
T18 15260 650 60 5.4 12.5
T19 18086 850 40 14.4 23
T20-T21 9970 650 42 7.2 12.5
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Figure 3: a) layout for the two case studies; b) features of the vessels and stored fluid density. 
3.2 Vessels vulnerability and failure frequencies 
Table 4 reports the vulnerability values obtained for the tanks applying the CFL approach. Both model and 
correlation results are reported. As expected, in the case of the low severity flood, with limited water height 
and velocity (e.g., case study 1) lower values of ψ (lower than 15 %) are obtained with both model and 
correlations. On the contrary, in the case of more severe flooding (e.g., case study 2), all the tank farm is 
subjected to severe damages. Table 4 shows also the evaluated LOC frequencies calculated for each tank 
on the basis of vulnerability assessment for the two case studies (fLOC). As shown in Table 4, LOC 
frequency values range between 9×10-5 and 3×10-3 1/y. As it can be seen, despite the lower vulnerability 
values, flooding conditions W1 lead to higher fLOC values due to low return period, thus presenting the 
higher contribution to the risk profile of the tank farm. It should be remarked that LOC events due to 
internal failure causes usually have comparable or even lower frequencies (Uijt de Haag and Ale, 1999) 
respect to the values calculated for the case study, confirming that in flood-prone zones, NaTech 
scenarios triggered by floods may have a significant impact on the tank farm safety management. 
4. Conclusions 
A model was developed to calculate the damage probability of atmospheric vessels in flood events. The 
modeling approach was validated against literature data, identifying the more critical parameters affecting 
vessel resistance. The model allowed determining an extended dataset of failure conditions which was 
used to obtain a simplified correlation for vessels failure and damage probability. Finally, the methodology 
was applied for the analysis of case studies. The results obtained confirmed that NaTech scenarios 
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caused by floods may affect the risk profile of industrial facilities due to the significant values of expected 
damage frequencies. 
Table 4: Results of the case study: vessels vulnerability (ψ, %) and expected failure frequency (fLOC, 1/y) 
as a function of the critical filling level (CFL, in %). NF = failure is not predicted by the model 
ID Vessel 
Case study 1 Case study 2 
Model Correlations Model Correlations 
CFL (%) ψ (%) fLOC (1/y) CFL (%) ψ (%) fLOC (1/y) CFL (%) ψ (%) fLOC (1/y) CFL (%) ψ (%) fLOC (1/y) 
T1-T2 1.0% NF NF  4.8% 5.2% 1.04×10-3 23.0% 29.7%5.89×10-4 30.3% 39.6% 7.83×10-4
T3-T4 2.9% 2.6% 5.15×10-4 5.2% 5.6% 1.12×10-3 26.1% 33.9%6.71×10-4 28.3% 36.9% 7.31×10-4
T5 3.8% 3.8% 7.59×10-4 3.9% 3.9% 7.78×10-4 19.1% 24.4%4.83×10-4 19.1% 24.5% 4.85×10-4
T6-T7 1.0% NF NF 3.7% 3.7% 7.42×10-4 17.8% 22.7%4.49×10-4 23.4% 30.3% 5.99×10-4
T8 1.0% NF NF 3.0% 2.7% 5.45×10-4 4.5% 4.7% 9.23×10-5 10.4% 12.7% 2.51×10-4
T9-T10 1.6% 0.9% 1.75×10-4 6.1% 6.9% 1.37×10-3 28.7% 37.4%7.40×10-4 33.1% 43.4% 8.59×10-4
T11 1.8% 1.1% 2.30×10-4 3.3% 3.1% 6.16×10-4 16.6% 21.1%4.17×10-4 18.0% 23.0% 4.55×10-4
T12 1.6% 0.7% 1.49×10-4 5.7% 6.4% 1.28×10-3 27.0% 35.1%6.95×10-4 31.1% 40.7% 8.07×10-4
T13 1.7% 0.9% 1.88×10-4 3.1% 2.9% 5.78×10-4 16.9% 21.6%4.27×10-4 18.4% 23.5% 4.65×10-4
T14-T15 2.6% 2.2% 4.31×10-4 2.7% 2.3% 4.69×10-4 14.6% 18.4%3.64×10-4 14.7% 18.6% 3.68×10-4
T16 1.0% NF NF 5.4% 6.0% 1.19×10-3 32.9% 43.0%8.52×10-4 39.5% 52.1% 1.03×10-3
T17 1.0% NF NF 5.1% 5.5% 1.11×10-3 7.5% 8.8% 1.75×10-4 17.6% 22.4% 4.43×10-4
T18 9.3% 11.3% 2.25×10-3 12.0% 14.8%2.97×10-3 42.6% 56.2%1.11×10-3 45.2% 59.8% 1.18×10-3
T19 1.0% NF NF  3.9% 3.9% 7.85×10-4 5.8% 6.4% 1.27×10-4 13.4% 16.8% 3.33×10-4
T20-T21 6.0% 6.8% 1.35×10-3 6.7% 7.7% 1.54×10-3 30.9% 40.4%8.01×10-4 31.6% 41.4% 8.20×10-4
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